cloud-security agent is a senior cloud security assessor covering AWS, Azure, and GCP. It combines configuration review, penetration testing, and compliance auditing into a single autonomous agent.
The agent operates in two modes:
- Advisory auditor — Configuration review, policy analysis, and architecture risk assessment. Available immediately, no authorization gate required.
- Pentest operator — Active exploitation and vulnerability validation. Requires explicit written authorization confirmation before any offensive action.
Activating the agent
- TUI
- CLI
Press
Tab until cloud-security appears in the status bar, then describe your target environment.Tools
| Category | Tools |
|---|---|
| Multi-cloud audit | ScoutSuite, Prowler, CloudSploit |
| AWS | AWS CLI, Prowler, Pacu (pentest mode only) |
| Azure | Azure CLI, ScoutSuite, ROADtools |
| GCP | gcloud CLI, ScoutSuite |
| Kubernetes | kube-bench, kube-hunter, kubeaudit, Trivy |
| IaC scanning | Checkov, Terrascan, tfsec, KICS |
| Container scanning | Trivy, Grype, Syft |
| Secret scanning | TruffleHog, GitLeaks, detect-secrets |
| Network | nmap (pentest mode only, rate-limited) |
Testing methodology
The agent follows a 14-phase methodology from scoping through reporting.Scoping and threat modeling
Collects business context, regulatory requirements (PCI, HIPAA, SOC2, GDPR), and identifies crown jewels — databases with PII, payment processors, authentication services. Builds a STRIDE or PASTA threat model for the top five data flows and produces a scope document with in/out-of-scope items.
Asset inventory
Enumerates all cloud resources non-intrusively: EC2 instances, S3 buckets, Lambda functions, load balancers, public IPs (AWS); resource groups, storage accounts, public IPs (Azure); compute instances, GCS buckets, external addresses (GCP). Builds a complete inventory before any testing begins.
IAM review
Generates and analyzes credential reports. Identifies users without MFA, inline policies with wildcard permissions, access keys older than 90 days, and overly broad role trust policies. On Azure, checks Owner/Contributor assignments at subscription level and service principal permissions. On GCP, finds
allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers IAM bindings and default service accounts with Editor role.Network and segmentation review
Identifies security groups allowing
0.0.0.0/0 ingress on sensitive ports (SSH, RDP, management interfaces). Reviews VPC peering connections and NACLs. On Azure, checks NSG rules for any allow from Internet. On GCP, checks for the default network and overly permissive firewall rules.Compute review
Checks for IMDSv1 on EC2 instances (vulnerable to SSRF-based token theft), Lambda environment variables containing secrets, and publicly accessible AMIs. Reviews Azure VM extensions and patch status. Checks GCP instances for use of the default service account with broad scopes.
Storage and data security
Checks all S3 buckets for public access block configuration and bucket policies granting access to the
* principal. Verifies account-level S3 Block Public Access is enabled. On Azure, checks Blob containers for public access. On GCP, checks for allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers on GCS bucket IAM policies.Container and Kubernetes review
Reviews RBAC for anonymous or unauthenticated access. Identifies privileged containers, pods running as root, and hostPath mounts. Checks for namespaces without network policies. Runs kube-bench against master and node targets. Reviews EKS, AKS, and GKE-specific configurations (public endpoint exposure, RBAC, private cluster mode).
Secrets and key management
Checks KMS key rotation status, Secrets Manager for unrotated secrets (AWS), Key Vault soft delete and purge protection settings (Azure), and Cloud KMS key rotation periods (GCP). Reviews CI/CD pipelines for hardcoded secrets and checks artifact registries for access controls.
Logging, monitoring, and detection
Verifies CloudTrail is enabled with multi-region coverage and log file validation (AWS). Checks GuardDuty and Security Hub status. On Azure, reviews Defender for Cloud pricing tiers and activity log retention. On GCP, reviews audit log configuration and log sink exports.
CI/CD and supply chain
Reviews pipeline definitions for hardcoded secrets, artifact registry access controls, build environment isolation, dependency scanning configuration, artifact signing and provenance, and OIDC federation for CI/CD (versus long-lived static credentials).
SaaS integrations and third-party access
Reviews SAML/OIDC identity provider configurations, cross-account role trust policies, marketplace integrations, OAuth app consents (particularly Azure AD Application.ReadWrite.All grants), and external sharing policies.
Vulnerability validation (pentest mode only)
Validates Critical and High findings through non-destructive proof techniques: reading canary files rather than production data, listing resource names rather than contents, and demonstrating privilege escalation to the role level without using it destructively. Every step requires explicit user approval before execution.
Provider checklists
AWS checklist
AWS checklist
IAM: Root account has MFA, no root access keys, user MFA enforced, no inline
*:* policies, access keys rotated within 90 days, ExternalId condition on cross-account trust policies, SCPs restrict dangerous actions.Network: No security group allows 0.0.0.0/0 on SSH (22) or RDP (3389), VPC flow logs enabled, default VPC unused, ALB access logs enabled.Storage: Account-level S3 Block Public Access enabled, all buckets encrypted, S3 access logging enabled, versioning on critical buckets.KMS: Customer-managed keys have auto-rotation enabled, key policies are restricted to necessary principals.Governance: AWS Organizations with SCPs, AWS Config enabled in all regions, GuardDuty enabled in all regions, Security Hub enabled.Azure checklist
Azure checklist
IAM: No Global Admin accounts without PIM activation, Conditional Access enforces MFA, legacy authentication blocked, service principals audited for excessive permissions, no User Access Administrator at root management group.Network: NSGs on all subnets with deny-all default, no wildcard allows on management ports, Network Watcher enabled, Private Endpoints used for PaaS services.Storage: No public blob access, HTTPS-only enforcement, TLS 1.2 minimum, storage firewall configured, soft delete enabled.Key Vault: Soft delete and purge protection enabled, network-restricted access, RBAC authorization model, diagnostic logging enabled.Governance: Management Groups configured, Azure Policy assignments, Defender for Cloud enabled for all resource types, Activity Log exported to storage or Log Analytics.
GCP checklist
GCP checklist
IAM: No
allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers IAM bindings, domain restriction org policy, Workload Identity used for GKE, default Compute Engine service account not used with Editor role, IAM recommender reviewed.Network: Default network deleted or restricted, no 0.0.0.0/0 SSH/RDP firewall rules, VPC flow logs enabled, Private Google Access enabled on subnets, Cloud Armor configured.Storage: Uniform bucket-level access enabled, no public bindings, CMEK, object versioning, retention policies on regulated data.Cloud KMS: Auto-rotation configured, access restricted to necessary service accounts, separated admin and user roles.Governance: Org policies configured, Security Command Center Premium, audit log sinks to external storage, VPC Service Controls on sensitive projects.Common IAM pitfalls
| Provider | Misconfiguration | What the agent checks |
|---|---|---|
| AWS | iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction = privilege escalation | IAM policies for PassRole combined with compute creation permissions |
| AWS | Confused deputy via sts:AssumeRole without ExternalId | Role trust policies for missing Condition blocks |
| AWS | S3 bucket policy granting access to * principal | Bucket policies parsed for wildcard principals |
| Azure | User Access Administrator at root management group | az role assignment list --scope "/" |
| Azure | Service principal with Application.ReadWrite.All | App registration Graph API permissions |
| GCP | Default Compute Engine SA with Editor role | Project metadata for default service account configuration |
| GCP | allUsers IAM binding | Project IAM policy for public bindings |
Example workflows
Finding output format
Each finding follows a structured template:- Cloud provider and service — e.g.,
AWS / S3 - Severity — Critical / High / Medium / Low / Informational with rationale
- Affected resources — ARN, resource ID, or name
- Steps to reproduce — Copy-pasteable CLI commands
- Evidence — Command output
- Impact and blast radius — Scope and business impact
- Root cause — Specific configuration detail
- Remediation — Short-term CLI fix and long-term architecture improvement
- Confidence — CONFIRMED / LIKELY / UNVERIFIED